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The Synergistic Evolution of Liberty and
Equality in the Marriage Cases Brought by
Same-Sex Couples in State Courts
Jean C. Love*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have expressed varying views about the role of liberty
and equality in gay rights litigation. For example, in 1988, Professor Cass
Sunstein took the position that the Due Process Clause is “backwardlooking,” protecting “traditional practices against short-run departures.” 1 By
contrast, he said that the Equal Protection Clause “looks forward, serving to
invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification.” 2
Therefore, he encouraged gay rights litigators to lead with equality. In 2000,
Professor William Eskridge challenged Sunstein’s thesis. He examined the
text and the history of the two clauses and concluded that both clauses are
simultaneously present-looking, forward-looking, and backward-looking. 3
Consequently, he took the position that the two clauses ought to be
distinguished on the basis of their function. 4 In the context of gay rights
litigation, he suggested that plaintiffs’ lawyers should rely first on the Due
Process Clause (particularly in its more procedural aspects) for making
disruptive challenges to statutes at the “retail level.” 5 Only later should they
invoke “evolutive equal protection” for making broad facial challenges to
statutes at the “wholesale level.” 6 More recently, Professor Kenji Yoshino
encouraged gay rights litigators to lead with liberty on the theory that the
recognition of liberty for all will serve to advance both liberty and equality. 7
Finally, a fourth legal scholar, Professor Pamela Karlan, has suggested that

* John A. and Elizabeth H. Sutro Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I dedicate this Article to
my spouse, Patricia A. Cain.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163, 1171 (2000).
2.

Id. at 1163.

3. William N. Eskridge, Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1185–86, 1218–19 (2000).
4.

Id. at 1186–87.

5.

Id. at 1186.

6.

Id.

7.

Kenji Yoshino, Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV. 961, 969–70 (2007).
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“sometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the lenses of both
the due process clause and the equal protection clause—can have synergistic
effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.” 8 In other
words, Professor Karlan’s theory would suggest that sometimes gay rights
litigators ought to lead with both liberty and equality simultaneously.
This Article will examine selected marriage cases brought by same-sex
couples in state courts in order to understand the role played by liberty and
equality in this one segment of gay rights litigation. At first, neither liberty
nor equality could dent the definition of marriage as an institution designed
exclusively for opposite-sex couples. 9 But gradually, over time, the interplay
between the claims of liberty and equality began to alter the state courts’
understanding of the institution of marriage. 10 It is the thesis of this Article
(written with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight) that, by focusing on the two
constitutional issues simultaneously, gay rights litigators in the state court
marriage cases have sparked a synergistic evolution of both liberty and
equality under state constitutional law.
This evolutionary process has not been linear. Instead, the courts have
typically taken two steps forward 11 and one step back. 12 At times, the liberty
claim and the equality claim have been in tension with one another. 13 At
other times, the two claims have complemented each other. 14 Yet, at all
times, the interplay between the two claims has challenged the judiciary to
rethink the fundamental question of whether marriage is an exclusive
institution for opposite-sex couples only.
This Article will trace the synergistic evolution of liberty and equality
in the state court marriage cases brought by same-sex couples. Its primary
purpose is to demonstrate the effectiveness of advancing the two claims
simultaneously when state constitutions are at issue. At the same time, gay
rights litigators in federal court marriage equality cases 15 may be interested
in this Article as well because the assertion of the two claims simultaneously
in the federal forum might spark a second, synergistic evolution of liberty
and equality under the Federal Constitution.
Finally, a subsidiary purpose of this Article is to parse and compare the
holdings in the key state court marriage equality cases in order to identify

8. Pamela Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002).
9.

See, e.g., infra notes 17–33 and accompanying text.

10.

See, e.g., infra notes 47–60 and accompanying text.

11.

See, e.g., infra notes 154–236 and accompanying text.

12.

See, e.g., infra notes 237–307 and accompanying text.

13.

See, e.g., infra notes 34–89 and accompanying text.

14.

See, e.g., infra notes 308–59 and accompanying text.

15. E.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV09-2292 (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 2009), available
at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/legal-filings/plaintiffs-filed-complaint/.
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each step in the process by which the courts gradually moved toward the
extension of marriage to same-sex couples. Parsing and comparing the
holdings is complicated by the fact that there is a split of opinion among the
justices in most of the cases under review. The phenomenon of fractured
courts in the state court marriage cases finally came to an end when the Iowa
Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion extending marriage to same-sex
couples in Varnum v. Brien. 16
II. BAKER V. NELSON: LIBERTY AND EQUALITY WITH NO SYNERGY
In the first marriage equality case, Baker v. Nelson, 17 a male couple
claimed in state court that Minnesota’s opposite-sex marriage statute denied
the plaintiffs both liberty and equality under the Federal Constitution. More
specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that “the right to marry without regard to
the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all persons,” and that
“restricting marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is irrational and
invidiously discriminatory.” 18 In essence, the plaintiffs were asking the court
to look at the marriage issue stereoscopically. They were challenging the
sex-based classification in the marriage statute as a denial of equal
protection, and simultaneously, they were inviting the court to broaden the
scope of the fundamental right to marry by defining that liberty interest
without regard to the sex of the parties. The plaintiffs were basing their
claim upon Loving v. Virginia, 19 a case that the United States Supreme Court
had decided three years earlier, in which the Court struck down Virginia’s
anti-miscegenation statute under both the Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution.
With regard to liberty, the Court in Loving declared: “The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 20 The Court further
recognized the freedom to marry as the right to marry a person of one’s
choice, and the Court characterized marriage as one of the “basic civil rights
of man.” 21 But when the plaintiffs in Baker v. Nelson asserted that they had
a fundamental right to marry, the Minnesota Supreme Court balked. 22 It
ignored the definition of marriage in Loving and relied instead on a very
traditional definition of marriage: “The institution of marriage, as a union of
man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children
16.

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).

17.

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).

18.

Id. at 186.

19.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

20.

Id. at 12.

21.

Id.

22.

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
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within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.” 23 Because the plaintiffs
(as a couple) could not procreate, the court rejected their liberty claim
outright, emphasizing that the Due Process Clause is “not a charter for
restructuring [marriage] by judicial legislation.” 24
With regard to equality, the Court in Loving applied strict scrutiny to
strike down a race-based classification. 25 Yet, when the plaintiffs in Baker v.
Nelson alleged that the Minnesota statute contained a sex-based
classification that also ought to be stricken under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Minnesota Supreme Court once again balked. 26 The court
accepted the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute contained a facial sex-based
classification, but it applied deferential low-level scrutiny and held that there
was “no irrational or invidious discrimination.” 27
The plaintiffs contended that the means were in fact not rationally
related to the State’s objective of promoting procreation because the statute
did not require opposite-sex couples to prove their capacity and willingness
to procreate as a condition of obtaining a marriage license. 28 The court
responded that “‘abstract symmetry’ is not demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 29 In a footnote, the court further observed that the Equal
Protection Clause “does not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” 30 The court
thereby suggested that same-sex couples are not similarly situated to
opposite-sex couples for purposes of marriage under the Equal Protection
Clause because they are unable to procreate. The court then distinguished
Loving on the ground that “in commonsense and in a constitutional sense,
there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon
race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.” 31
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the opposite-sex marriage
statute did not violate the Federal Constitution. 32 The United States Supreme
Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal for want of a substantial federal
question. 33 In the beginning, then, the ability to procreate defined the scope
of the right to marry, and the inability of same-sex couples to procreate
23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.

26.

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 187.

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id. (quoting Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143 (1914)).

30.

Id. at 187 n.4.

31.

Id. at 187.

32.

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 187.

33.

Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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justified their exclusion from the institution of marriage under the Equal
Protection Clause. Neither a liberty claim nor an equality claim was strong
enough to overcome the power of the traditional definition of marriage, and
advancing the two claims simultaneously sparked absolutely no synergy
whatsoever.
III. BAEHR V. LEWIN: LIBERTY AND EQUALITY WITH A HINT OF SYNERGY
When same-sex couples renewed their commitment to the fight for
marriage equality two decades later, they sought to avoid the adverse impact
of Baker v. Nelson 34 by filing their complaints in state courts and alleging
violations of state constitutions. In the first such case, Baehr v. Lewin, 35 the
plaintiffs (three same-sex couples) alleged a denial of both liberty and
equality under the Hawaii Constitution. 36 The Hawaii Supreme Court had a
tradition of looking first to federal law when interpreting the state
constitution, but it also was willing to construe the state constitution
independently of the Federal Constitution. 37
With regard to the liberty claim in Baehr, the plaintiffs asked the court
to recognize a “new fundamental right,” namely, “a right to same-sex
marriage.” 38 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the court chose to construe the
State’s due process clause in accord with the Federal Constitution. 39
Moreover, the court chose to interpret the Federal Constitution in keeping
with Professor Sunstein’s theory that the Due Process Clause is “backwardlooking,” protecting fundamental rights that are rooted in tradition. 40 When
the court examined the relevant United States Supreme Court opinions, 41 it
found a “link” between the right to marry and the right to procreate. 42
Consequently, the court concluded that the “federal construct of the
fundamental right to marry . . . presently contemplates unions between men
and women.” 43 Turning to the issue before it, the court said that the question
was “whether we will hold that same-sex couples possess a fundamental

34. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
35.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).

36.

Id. at 50.

37.

Id. at 57.

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 55.

40.

See Sunstein, supra note 1.

41.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55–56.

42.

Id. at 56.

43.

Id.
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right to marry.” 44 Not surprisingly, given the framing of the issue, the court
rejected the plaintiffs’ liberty claim outright for the following reasons:
[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted
in the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure
to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty
and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex
marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed. 45
Accordingly, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not have a fundamental
constitutional right to same-sex marriage under the due process clause of the
state constitution. 46
With regard to the equality claim, the plaintiffs asked the court to rule
that the State’s ban on same-sex marriage violated Hawaii’s equal protection
clause, which provides in relevant part: “No person shall . . . be denied equal
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person’s civil
rights . . . because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.” 47 Fortunately for the
plaintiffs, the court chose to construe the State’s equal protection clause
independently of the Federal Constitution on the ground that the text of the
State’s equal protection clause is not a mirror image of the Federal
Constitution. 48 Moreover, the court chose to construe the state constitution
in accord with Professor Sunstein’s theory that an equal protection clause is
generally forward-looking. 49
The first question that arose under the State’s equal protection clause
was whether marriage is a civil right. 50 After consulting a dictionary, a
plurality of the court (later to become a majority) announced that “civil
rights” are “civil liberties,” which in turn may be defined as “[p]ersonal,
natural rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution.” 51 The plurality
then held that marriage is a civil right. 52 The plurality supported its holding
by quoting the following sentence from the due process section of Loving v.

44.

Id. at 57.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.

48.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59.

49. That is, through an equality claim, a disadvantaged group may ask a court to examine the
effect of a traditional practice (such as opposite-sex marriage) and eliminate the adverse impact of
that traditional practice on currently disadvantaged groups (such as same-sex couples). See supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
50.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.
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Virginia: 53 “‘The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
[people].’” 54 The plurality went on to say: “So ‘fundamental’ does the
United States Supreme Court consider the institution of marriage that it has
deemed marriage to be ‘one of the “basic civil rights of [men and
women].”’” 55
The two dissenting judges, who had joined the plurality in rejecting the
plaintiffs’ liberty claim, criticized the plurality for ruling that there is a
“‘civil right’ to a same sex marriage” under the State’s equal protection
clause. 56 From the dissenters’ point of view, the plurality’s ruling was
inconsistent with the court’s holding that there was no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage under the State’s due process clause. 57 The plurality
responded by saying that it had “not held” that the plaintiffs “have a ‘civil
right’ to a same sex marriage,” but rather, it had simply “noted that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized for over fifty years that
marriage is a basic civil right.” 58 From the plurality’s standpoint, the
Supreme Court’s recognition that marriage is a civil right was at least
“relevant” to a proper interpretation of the State’s equal protection clause. 59
This is the moment when one can begin to see a hint of the synergistic
evolution of liberty and equality in Baehr. Even though the Hawaii Supreme
Court was not willing to hold that the plaintiffs had a fundamental right to
same-sex marriage under the State’s due process clause, the plurality was
willing to find that marriage is a “civil right” under the State’s equal
protection clause. 60 The plurality took the concept that marriage is a “civil
right” directly from the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of
“liberty” in Loving. Linguistically, defining marriage as a “civil right” for
purposes of the equal protection clause permitted the plurality to shift its
focus from the “link” between marriage and procreation to the “link”
between marriage and the pursuit of happiness.
The second question under Hawaii’s equal protection clause was
whether the opposite-sex marriage statute denied the plaintiffs the enjoyment
of the civil right of marriage because of sex. The plaintiffs had alleged, and
the defendant’s amended answer had admitted, that the State denied the
plaintiffs’ applications for marriage licenses on the ground that “each couple

53.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

54.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 70 (Heen, J., dissenting).

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 67 (plurality opinion).

59.

Id.

60.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
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was of the same sex.” 61 Based on these pleadings, the plurality took the
position that the statute, both “on its face” and “as applied,” regulated access
to the status of marriage on the basis of the applicant’s sex. 62
The dissenting judges chose to focus not on the defendant’s amended
answer, but rather on his answering brief, with which they agreed. 63 The
defendant’s answering brief took the position that the plaintiffs were not
denied marriage licenses “because of their sex,” but rather because of their
“biologic inability as a couple to satisfy the definition of the status to which
they aspire.” 64 Put another way, the defendant argued that “the right of
persons of the same sex to marry one another does not exist because
marriage, by definition and usage, means a special relationship between a
man and a woman.” 65 In effect, the defendant contended that same-sex
couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples for purposes of
marriage because they are unable to procreate. The plurality rejected the
defendant’s argument on the grounds that it was not only “circular and
unpersuasive,” 66 but also an “exercise in tortured and conclusory
sophistry.” 67 The plurality was able to dismiss the defendant’s argument so
decisively because it had held that marriage is a “civil right,” thereby linking
marriage to the pursuit of happiness (rather than to procreation). 68
The concurring judge thought that the statute, which distinguished
between “same-sex couples” and “opposite-sex couples,” might be found to
contain a sexual orientation-based classification that would be the equivalent
of a sex-based classification (provided the plaintiffs could submit proof at
trial that sexual orientation is “biologically fated”). 69 The plurality disagreed
because it opined that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples was
not the same as denying marriage licenses to homosexuals. 70 Furthermore,
the plurality took the position that the statute did not contain a facial sexual
orientation-based classification. 71 The plurality based its position on the
following line of reasoning: “Parties to ‘a union between a man and a
woman’ may or may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage

61.

Id. at 50.

62.

Id. at 60.

63.

Id. at 70–71, 73 (Heen, J., dissenting).

64.

Id. at 60–61 (plurality opinion).

65.

Id. at 61.

66.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.

67.

Id. at 63.

68.

See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.

69.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69–70 (Burns, J., concurring).

70.

Id. at 52 n.11 (plurality opinion).

71.

Id.
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could theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals.” 72 The two
dissenting judges agreed with the plurality that the text of the statute did not
facially discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
The dissenters also took the position that the text of the statute did not
facially discriminate on the basis of sex because it applied equally to both
men and women. 73 Women could not marry women, and men could not
marry men. 74 In other words, the dissenting judges would have recognized
the equal application defense. 75 The plurality disagreed, taking the position
that Loving expressly rejected the equal application defense in the context of
a challenge to an anti-miscegenation statute containing a race-based
classification. Consequently, the plurality concluded by way of analogy that
it was free to reject the equal application defense in the context of a
challenge to an opposite-sex marriage statute containing a sex-based
classification. 76
The plurality knew that, under the Federal Equal Protection Clause, sexbased classifications are subject to intermediate-level scrutiny. 77 But
Hawaii’s equal rights amendment provides: “Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex.” 78 Therefore,
the issue before the court was whether the equal rights amendment required
the application of intermediate-level scrutiny or strict scrutiny to a sex-based
classification. The plurality ruled: “In light of . . . the presence of article I,
section 3—the Equal Rights Amendment—in the Hawaii Constitution, . . .
we hold that sex is a ‘suspect category’ for purposes of equal protection
analysis under article I, section 5 . . . and that [the marriage statute] is
subject to the ‘strict scrutiny’ test.” 79
The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment for the
defendant on the pleadings and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with the plurality opinion. 80 The defendant
moved for reconsideration or clarification because the court had split

72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting).

74.

Id.

75.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 72.

76.

Id. at 68 (plurality opinion).

77.

Id. at 64 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).

78.

HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3.

79. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. Earlier cases in Hawaii had avoided the issue of whether “sex”
should be treated as a “suspect classification” under the state constitution. See, e.g., Holdman v.
Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Haw. 1978) (holding that the court did not need to reach the issue of
whether sex was a suspect category because a prison rule requiring female visitors to wear brassieres
would have satisfied the compelling state interest test under strict scrutiny).
80.

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
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regarding its interpretation of the equal protection clause. 81 At the time of
the hearing on the defendant’s motion, one of the two dissenting judges had
been replaced by a judge who was willing to support the plurality opinion. 82
This change in the composition of the court effectively turned the plurality
opinion into a majority opinion.
On remand, the trial court applied strict scrutiny to the sex-based
classification. 83 It found that the statute was unconstitutional because the
State had “failed to present sufficient credible evidence which demonstrates
that the public interest in the well-being of children and families . . . would
be adversely affected by same-sex marriage.” 84 The trial court then issued an
injunction prohibiting the State from denying an application for a marriage
license solely because the applicants were of the same sex. 85
The State obtained a stay of the injunction pending its appeal of the
case. 86 Before the Hawaii Supreme Court could consider that appeal,
however, the people of Hawaii voted to adopt a constitutional amendment
that gave the legislature the exclusive authority to define marriage in the
State of Hawaii. 87 The legislature chose to define marriage as a union
between one man and one woman. 88 Thus, within the context of a single
case, the evolution of marriage equality had moved two steps forward and
one giant step back.
Baehr is a case in which there was an incredible tension between the
liberty claim and the equality claim. Under the “backward-looking” liberty
theory, the Hawaii Supreme Court (like the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Baker v. Nelson) found that the fundamental right to marry under the Federal
Constitution was inextricably linked to the right to procreate. Because the
court chose to construe the state constitutional right to liberty in accord with
the Federal Constitution, the plaintiffs could not mount a successful
challenge to the marriage statute under the State’s due process clause.
When the Hawaii Supreme Court turned its attention to the unique text
of the State’s equal protection clause (prohibiting the denial of “civil rights”
on the basis of sex), the court chose to construe the state constitution
81.

Id. at 74 (2–1–2 decision).

82. Id. at 74–75. See also Nancy Klingeman & Kenneth May, Recent Development, For
Better or for Worse, in Sickness and in Health, Until Death Do Us Part: A Look at Same-Sex
Marriage in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 447, 480 (1994).
83.

Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *19 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).

84.

Id. at *21.

85.

Id. at *22.

86. See David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of
Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1997).
87. The Hawaii Constitution, article 1, section 23, provides that “[t]he legislature shall have
the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”
88. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (LexisNexis 2009). The legislature recognized only
reciprocal beneficiary status for same-sex couples. Id. § 572C-4.
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independently of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, the court was free
to depart from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker v. Nelson that
the inability of same-sex couples to procreate justified their exclusion from
the institution of marriage under the Federal Equal Protection Clause. The
questions before the court under the State’s equal protection clause were
whether marriage is a “civil right” and, if so, whether same-sex couples
could justifiably be excluded from the institution of marriage as so defined.
In concluding that marriage is a “civil right,” the Hawaii Supreme Court
relied on the due process section of Loving, in which the United States
Supreme Court characterized marriage as a “basic civil right” that is
“essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.” 89 This is the moment when
the court recognized a hint of synergy between liberty and equality in Baehr.
Once the court had linked marriage to the pursuit of happiness (rather than to
procreation), it was in a position to reject the defendant’s argument that
same-sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples for
purposes of marriage because of their inability to procreate. That ruling then
set the stage for the court to become the first state high court to announce
that the classification in an opposite-sex marriage statute is a sex-based,
suspect classification that is not vulnerable to the equal application defense
and that must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Needless to say, if the State’s
equal protection clause had not explicitly protected “civil rights,” and if the
court had not recognized the synergy between liberty and equality in
construing the phrase “civil rights,” the case might have come out very
differently, given that the court was so severely splintered.
IV. BAKER V. STATE: EQUAL BENEFITS WITHOUT EQUAL STATUS
The second major marriage equality case to be brought under a state
constitution was Baker v. State. 90 The plaintiffs were same-sex couples who
claimed that Vermont’s opposite-sex marriage statute violated several
provisions of the state constitution. 91 The Vermont Supreme Court chose to
focus exclusively on the common benefits clause, which provides: “That
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection,
and security of the people, nation, or community; and not for the particular
emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who
are a part only of that community . . . .” 92 The clause promotes the principle
of equality, although technically it is neither an equal protection clause nor
an equal rights amendment. 93

89.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).

90.

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).

91.

Id. at 870 n.2.

92.

VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.

93.

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 870–71.
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Early in its opinion, the Vermont Supreme Court discussed the
historical origins of the common benefits clause. The clause was originally
designed to prevent the establishment of the equivalent of British royalty,
but the court found that the American Revolution had also “tapped deepseated domestic antagonisms” against such groups as “New Yorkers
claiming Vermont lands.” 94 Consequently, the court concluded that the
common benefits clause was not “principally concerned with civil rights for
African-Americans and other minorities,” but rather with “access to public
benefits and protections for the community as a whole.” 95
Given the historical origins of the common benefits clause, the Vermont
Supreme Court announced that, when analyzing laws challenged under the
clause, it would apply a relatively uniform standard of non-deferential, lowlevel scrutiny (rather than the multi-tiered analysis developed under the
Fourteenth Amendment). 96 It described its test for low-level scrutiny under
the common benefits clause as “broadly deferential to the legislative
prerogative to define and advance governmental ends, while vigorously
ensuring that the means chosen bear a just and reasonable relation to the
governmental objective.” 97 The court also explained that it would consider
three factors when applying its test for low-level scrutiny: “(1) the
significance of the benefits . . . of the challenged law; (2) whether the
omission of members of the community from the benefits . . . of the
challenged law promotes the government’s stated goals; and (3) whether the
classification is significantly underinclusive or overinclusive.” 98
In considering the first factor, the Vermont Supreme Court examined
the significance of civil marriage under the common benefits clause. 99 The
court followed in the footsteps of Baehr v. Lewin 100 by noting that, in the
due process section of Loving v. Virginia, 101 the United States Supreme
Court observed that “‘[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights.’” 102 The court therefore concluded that the
multitude of benefits and obligations that flow from civil marriage
“significantly enhance the quality of life in our society.” 103
This is the moment when one can begin to see a hint of synergy

94.

Id. at 875.

95.

Id. at 876.

96.

Id. at 877–78.

97.

Id. at 871.

98.

Id. at 879.

99.

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 883.

100.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 883 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
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between liberty and equality in Baker v. State. The court had defined the
“common benefit” of marriage by reference to the definition of the
fundamental right to marry in Loving. Therefore, the court was prepared to
focus throughout the remainder of its opinion on the link between marriage
and the pursuit of happiness, rather than on the link between marriage and
procreation.
Having established the significance of the benefits at issue under the
common benefits clause, the court next considered the nature of the
classification that excluded the plaintiffs from access to those benefits. The
majority announced in a single sentence that the marriage statute excluded
“anyone who wishe[d] to marry someone of the same sex.” 104 The
concurring judge explained in greater detail that, although the marriage
statute did “not facially discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,”
there could be “no doubt” that the statute had “the effect of discriminating
against lesbian and gay couples . . . who [were] unable to marry the life
partners of their choice.” 105 Because the court had chosen to focus on the
link between marriage and the pursuit of happiness, it was the first state high
court to understand that the classification at issue was in effect a sexual
orientation-based classification. 106
The Vermont Supreme Court was aware of the fact that the Hawaii
Supreme Court had found a facial sex-based classification in Baehr, but the
court disagreed with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s analysis. The court
thought that the Vermont marriage statute was “facially neutral” with regard
to gender because it did not “single out men or women as a class for
disparate treatment.” 107 Rather, it prohibited both “men and women equally
from marrying a person of the same sex.” 108 In other words, the court
permitted the State to assert the equal application defense in response to the
plaintiffs’ claim that the statute contained a sex-based classification. 109 The
court distinguished Loving on the ground that, in Loving, the United States
Supreme Court had found evidence that the legislature’s “real purpose was
to maintain the pernicious doctrine of white supremacy.” 110 The court could
find no evidence of a comparably pernicious legislative motive to maintain
male supremacy. 111 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence
demonstrated a discriminatory purpose, the court said:

104.

Id. at 880.

105.

Id. at 890.
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Id.

107.

Id. at 880 n.13.
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Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
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It is one thing to show that long-repealed marriage statutes
subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is quite
another to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage laws
excluded same-sex couples because of incorrect and discriminatory
assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about gender-role
confusion. 112
The court concluded that, in the absence of the latter type of evidence, the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the statute contained a sex-based
classification. 113
One judge, Judge Johnson, dissented in part with regard to the
classification issue. 114 She emphasized the fact that the statute did not
classify facially on the basis of sexual orientation, and she stated her opinion
that “this is a straightforward case of sex discrimination.” 115 Furthermore,
she took the position that the sex-based classification ought to trigger
heightened scrutiny under the common benefits clause. 116 She found that the
equal application defense did not apply because marriage is an individual
right, not a group right. 117 She also expressed her opinion that the sex-based
classification in the Vermont marriage statute was a “vestige of sex-role
stereotyping.” 118 She acknowledged that the sex-role stereotyping at issue
harmed both men and women, 119 but she thought that the common benefits
clause precluded the State from continuing to give “credence to generally
discredited sex-role stereotyping.” 120
Once the Vermont Supreme Court had determined that the classification
at issue was in effect a sexual-orientation based classification, its third task
was to consider whether the classification was justifiable under its test of
non-deferential, low-level scrutiny. More specifically, the court had to
determine whether the State could prove a “legitimate public purpose” 121 for
the sexual orientation-based classification and, if so, whether the State could
show that the means “reasonably relate[d]” to that end. 122 It should be noted
that the Vermont Supreme Court was the first state high court to consider the
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Id.
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Id.
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Baker v. State, 744 A.2d at 904–05 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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question of whether the state had established an adequate justification for a
denial of marriage equality under a state constitution. Perhaps that is what
motivated the State to advance such a dizzying array of justifications for its
opposite-sex marriage statute. 123 The court seriously considered only two of
them. 124
First, the Vermont Supreme Court focused on the State’s argument that
the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage promotes
procreation and furthers “the link between procreation and child rearing,”
which serves to ensure that the offspring of opposite-sex couples “are
considered legitimate and receive ongoing parental support.” 125 The court
acknowledged that these are valid public interests and that the overwhelming
majority of births in Vermont result from natural conception. 126 However, it
also noted that many opposite-sex couples marry for reasons unrelated to
procreation. 127 Moreover, married opposite-sex couples who are incapable
of having children through natural conception may either adopt children or
utilize assisted-reproductive techniques. 128 Therefore, the court found that
“if the purpose of the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples is to ‘further[]
the link between procreation and child rearing,’ then it is significantly
underinclusive.” 129 Furthermore, the court found that the exclusion of samesex couples with children from the institution of marriage “exposes their
children to the precise risks that the State argues the marriage laws are
designed to secure against,” thereby making the statutory exclusion of all
same-sex couples significantly over-inclusive. 130 In other words, the court
said, the statutory exclusion of all same-sex couples “treats persons who are
similarly situated for purposes of the law, differently,” and for this reason the
court found that the means were not reasonably related to the end. 131
Second, the State argued that, “because same-sex couples cannot
conceive a child on their own, their exclusion [from marriage] promotes a
‘perception of the link between procreation and child rearing,’ and that to
discard [the perception] would ‘advance the notion that mothers and
fathers . . . are mere surplusage to the functions of procreation and child
rearing.’” 132 The court found that, even if sending a public message about
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Id. at 881, 884–85.
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Id. at 881.
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the link between procreation and child-rearing is a legitimate governmental
objective, nevertheless the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is a
grossly under-inclusive means to that end. 133 The court noted that most of
the people who use assisted-reproductive techniques are “infertile married
couples.” 134 The court further noted that the State had never suggested that a
married couple’s use of assisted-reproductive techniques would undermine
anyone’s sense of parental responsibility. 135 Nor had the State taken any
steps to restrict access to such techniques as a matter of public policy. 136
Consequently, there was no reasonable basis to conclude that a same-sex
couple’s use of assisted-reproductive technologies would undermine
society’s perception of the link between procreation and child-rearing. 137
Having determined that the plaintiffs had been unconstitutionally
denied the benefits of marriage in violation of the common benefits clause,
the Vermont Supreme Court turned to the question of what would be an
appropriate remedy. The plaintiffs had sought declaratory relief and an
injunction prohibiting the State from denying marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. 138 The court observed, however, that the plaintiffs’ claims and their
arguments on appeal had focused primarily on the consequences of being
excluded from “the statutory benefits, protections, and security incident to
marriage under Vermont law.” 139 Therefore, the court decided to hold
“only” that the plaintiffs were entitled to obtain “the [statutory] benefits and
protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples.” 140
The court then left it up to the legislature to craft “an appropriate means of
addressing this constitutional mandate.” 141 The court suggested that the
legislature could extend marriage to same-sex couples, but it also indicated
that the legislature could create an alternative status for same-sex couples,
such as domestic partnerships. 142 The court retained jurisdiction over the
case, stating: “In the event that the benefits and protections in question are
not statutorily granted, plaintiffs may petition this Court to order the remedy
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they originally sought.” 143
Judge Johnson, dissenting in part, objected to the majority’s “novel and
truncated remedy.” 144 She took the position that it is “not only the
prerogative but the duty of courts to provide prompt relief for violations of
individual civil rights.” 145 She stated her opinion that this principle ensures
that “laws enacted through the will of the majority do not unconstitutionally
infringe upon the rights of a disfavored minority.” 146 Since the majority had
found that the plaintiffs were entitled to those benefits and protections
afforded under Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples, she suggested
that “the most straightforward and effective remedy” would be to issue an
injunction prohibiting the State from denying the plaintiffs’ applications for
marriage licenses solely because they were couples of the same sex. 147 After
all, that was the remedy which the trial court judge had awarded to the
plaintiffs in Baehr. 148
Judge Johnson somewhat disparagingly described the majority’s
remedy as “little more than a declaration of rights.” 149 Furthermore, because
the majority had suspended its declaratory judgment, she ultimately
characterized the majority’s remedy as an “advisory opinion that leaves
plaintiffs without redress and sends the matter to an uncertain fate in the
Legislature.” 150 She must have experienced mixed emotions a few months
later when the Vermont legislature took action in a timely fashion but chose
to create civil unions for same-sex couples, rather than granting them equal
access to civil marriage. 151
The Vermont Supreme Court was the first state high court to
characterize the classification in an opposite-sex marriage statute as an
implicit sexual orientation-based classification. The court based its
description of the classification at issue upon its understanding that the
“common benefit” of marriage is “one of the vital personal rights” 152
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness. The court thus understood that
the opposite-sex marriage statute would have the effect of preventing all
lesbian and gay same-sex couples from marrying the life partners of their
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choice. Unlike the Hawaii Supreme Court, 153 the Vermont Supreme Court
did not focus on the language of gender that appeared on the face of the
opposite-sex marriage statute. By describing the classification at issue as an
implicit sexual orientation-based classification, the Vermont Supreme Court
might have enhanced the public’s understanding of the basis for the
plaintiffs’ claim to marriage equality, and without a doubt the court made it
possible to ignore the intricacies of the equal application defense.
By characterizing the classification at issue as a sexual orientationbased classification, the Vermont Supreme Court also opened the door to the
application of non-deferential, low-level scrutiny. As a result, the court
became the first state high court to scrutinize the state’s justifications for its
opposite-sex marriage statute (e.g., procreation and furthering the link
between procreation and child-rearing) and to hold that the state had failed
to carry its burden of justification because the means were not reasonably
related to the ends. Nevertheless, the court found only a violation of the
common benefits clause. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
needed no more by way of a remedy than a declaration that they were
entitled to the same statutory benefits and protections as those that Vermont
law afforded married opposite-sex couples. That holding set the stage for the
Vermont legislature to create the unique institution of civil unions for samesex couples.
Baker v. State represents a very significant step forward in the evolution
of marriage equality for same-sex couples. At the same time, it is a case in
which the court chose to focus exclusively on the common benefits clause
challenge, which was in essence an equality claim. Consequently, the court
was in a position to be able to hold that the plaintiffs were entitled to no
more than the statutory benefits incident to marriage, and not to the full
status of marriage.
V. GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH: EQUAL BENEFITS AND
EQUAL STATUS
The plaintiffs in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 154 were
same-sex couples who had learned the lessons of Baker v. State. 155 Their
complaint asserted both a liberty claim and an equality claim under the state
constitution of Massachusetts, 156 and their complaint sought a declaratory
judgment that “the exclusion of the [p]laintiff couples and other qualified
same-sex couples from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social
status of civil marriage, as well as the protections, benefits and obligations
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See generally Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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of marriage, violates Massachusetts law.” 157 Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that the State’s marriage law violated article I of the State’s
constitution, which provides in relevant part:
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural,
essential and inalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; . . . in fine,
that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality
under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race,
color, creed or national origin. 158
The word “sex” had been added to article I in 1976, when the people of
Massachusetts had voted in favor of that State’s equal rights amendment. 159
The relevant legislative history suggested that the equal rights amendment
would have “no effect upon the allowance or denial of homosexual
marriages.” 160 Rather, it indicated that the amendment would address only
those laws that treated persons of opposite sexes differently. 161
The first question before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
was one of statutory interpretation. The legislation at issue set minimum
qualifications for obtaining “a marriage license.” 162 The issue was whether
the term “marriage” could be construed as permitting same-sex couples to
marry. The court held that the “everyday meaning” of “marriage” is the
“legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife.” 163 Therefore, the
court held that the undefined word “marriage” in the State’s marriage license
statute could not be construed to permit same-sex couples to marry. 164
The larger question before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
was whether the opposite-sex marriage statute violated the state constitution.
Although the court had construed the statute so as to honor the traditional
definition of marriage, the plurality emphasized that “history cannot and
does not foreclose the constitutional question.” 165 The court observed that
the constitutional issue might be analyzed in two ways: 1) Did the marriage
statute deny the constitution’s guarantee of equality? 2) Did the
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Id.

158. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (amended 1976) (as amended by article 106 of the amendments
to the constitution of the commonwealth, which is referred to as the equal rights amendment).
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constitutional guarantee of liberty secure to each of the plaintiffs the right to
marry his or her “chosen partner”? 166 The three-judge plurality considered
both questions simultaneously, while the concurring judge collapsed them
into a single question by asking whether the marriage statute contained a
classification that burdened a fundamental right in violation of the state
constitution’s guarantee of equality. 167 The court pointed out that, in matters
involving family law (such as interracial marriage), “the two constitutional
concepts frequently overlap, as they do here,” 168 thereby suggesting that the
court understood the synergistic potential of considering liberty and equality
simultaneously. The court also observed: “The Massachusetts Constitution
is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the
Federal Constitution; it may demand broader protection for fundamental
rights; and it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected
spheres of private life.” 169
In a single passage, the court described civil marriage, identified the
issue in the case, and announced its holding:
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive commitment
of two individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support;
it brings stability to our society. For those who choose to marry,
and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal,
financial, and social benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal,
financial, and social obligations. The question before us is whether,
consistent
with
the
Massachusetts
Constitution,
the
Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who
wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. The Massachusetts
Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It
forbids the creation of second-class citizens. . . .
....
....
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of
civil marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive
union with another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of
membership in one of our community’s most rewarding and
cherished institutions. That exclusion is incompatible with the
constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and
equality under law. 170
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Three judges dissented from the court’s bold holding. They would have
found that marriage is a union between one man and one woman. 171 Then
they would have ruled that the marriage statute imposed “no restriction on
the right of any plaintiff to enter into marriage” because “[e]ach is free to
marry a willing person of the opposite sex.” 172
The court’s definition of marriage (i.e., the exclusive commitment of
two individuals to each other) reflects its understanding that the right to
marry is a civil right, and that marriage is linked to the pursuit of happiness,
rather than to procreation. The court’s statement of the issue is implicitly
premised on the view that same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are
similarly situated with regard to the institution of marriage (as defined by the
court). And the court’s unprecedented holding extends to same-sex couples
both the status and the benefits of marriage. By honoring the dignity and
equality of all individuals and by forbidding the creation of second-class
citizens, the court’s holding dramatically demonstrates the synergistic power
of liberty and equality when they are analyzed as overlapping constitutional
claims.
By considering liberty and equality simultaneously, the court broke
away from cases such as Baker v. Nelson 173 and Baehr v. Lewin 174 that had
rejected the liberty claim outright because same-sex couples do not fit the
traditional definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman.
And, by discussing equality and liberty simultaneously, the court broke
away from cases such as Baker v. Nelson that had rejected the equality claim
outright because same-sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex
couples with regard to the ability to procreate. Finally, by considering liberty
and equality simultaneously, the court parted company with cases such as
Baker v. State that had extended to same-sex couples only the benefits of
marriage, and not the status of marriage.
Even though the court initially discussed liberty and equality
simultaneously, the court still had to consider liberty and equality separately
in order to determine what level of scrutiny to apply. With regard to the due
process claim, the court splintered. The concurring judge found that “the
right to marry” (including the right to marry someone of the same sex) is a
“fundamental right” subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause. 175 Therefore, if he had considered the due process claim, he would
have applied strict scrutiny. The three dissenting judges found that the “right

171. Id. at 975 n.3 (Spina, J., dissenting) (citing Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. (1 Tyng) 48
(1810)).
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to same-sex marriage” is not a fundamental right, 176 and therefore, at best,
they would have applied deferential low-level scrutiny. 177
The three-judge plurality described the right to marry as the “right to
marry the person of one’s choice,” 178 and it also said that marriage has long
been termed a “civil right.” 179 But then the plurality announced that it would
subject the statute to low-level scrutiny, 180 although it would be a form of
low-level scrutiny that “is not ‘toothless.’” 181 The plurality offered the
following explanation for its decision not to apply heightened scrutiny:
“Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not
consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that this case merits strict judicial
scrutiny.” 182
Turning to the equal protection claim, all of the members of the court
agreed that the statute did not contain a facial sexual orientation-based
classification. 183 But then the court once again splintered. The concurring
judge, who rejected the equal application defense, found that the statute
contained a facial sex-based classification. 184 He would have been willing to
apply strict scrutiny under the equal rights amendment, but he had to
acknowledge that the voters who had approved the equal rights amendment
in 1976 did not intend for it to have the effect of allowing or denying samesex marriage. 185 Therefore, in the end, he took the position that the
classification at issue ought to be subjected to strict scrutiny because it
burdened a fundamental right. 186
The three dissenting judges found that the classification was not a sexbased classification since the statute applied to men and women “in precisely
the same way.” 187 Rather, they took the position that the statute
distinguished facially between opposite-sex couples (who could obtain a
marriage license) and same-sex couples (who could not). 188 Because the
dissenting judges characterized this classification as non-suspect, they would
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have applied deferential low-level scrutiny. 189
The plurality did not consider the question of whether the statute
contained a sex-based classification. Instead, it agreed with the dissenting
judges that the statute facially distinguished between same-sex couples and
opposite-sex couples. 190 At this point in its analysis, however, the plurality
parted company with the dissenters. The plurality suggested that the
distinction between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples in effect
classified on the basis of sexual orientation because it deprived an individual
of access to the institution of marriage when his or her chosen partner was a
person of the same sex. 191 The plurality then announced that it would once
again apply the type of low-level scrutiny that “is not ‘toothless.’” 192 It
offered the following explanation for its failure to consider whether “sexual
orientation” is a “suspect” classification: “We have not previously
considered whether ‘sexual orientation’ is a ‘suspect’ classification. Our
resolution of this case does not require that inquiry here.” 193
Since the plurality thought that both the liberty claim and the equality
claim ought to be subjected to the type of low-level scrutiny that “is not
‘toothless,’” the plurality put the burden on the defendant to prove that the
classification in the statute bore a “reasonable relationship” to a legitimate
objective. 194 This resembled the level of scrutiny that the Vermont Supreme
Court had applied in Baker v. State. The defendant in Goodridge set forth
three justifications, 195 but a majority of the court rejected them all.
The first of the justifications was “providing a ‘favorable setting for
procreation.’” 196 The trial court judge had endorsed this justification when
granting the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment. The trial court
judge had ruled that “the state’s interest in regulating marriage is based on
the traditional concept that marriage’s primary purpose is procreation.” 197
The plurality said: “This is incorrect.” 198
The plurality opinion went on to explain that the State’s civil marriage
laws “do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married
people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of
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creating a family.” 199 Moreover, the plurality emphatically asserted that “it
is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one
another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil
marriage.” 200 The plurality opinion observed that “[t]he ‘marriage is
procreation’ argument singles out the one unbridgeable difference between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that difference into the
essence of legal marriage.” 201 In so doing, the plurality thought that “the
State’s action confer[red] an official stamp of approval on the destructive
stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to
opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect.” 202
The second of the justifications was “ensuring the optimal setting for
child rearing.” 203 The plurality noted that the State’s first justification
“shades imperceptibly into its second.” 204 The plurality acknowledged that
“[p]rotecting the welfare of children” is undoubtedly a legitimate
objective. 205 However, it took the position that restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples could not possibly further that objective, since samesex couples also raise children. 206
Moreover, the State had not offered evidence to prove that forbidding
marriage to same-sex couples would increase the number of opposite-sex
couples who would want to marry and have children. 207 Therefore, there was
no “reasonable relationship” between the State’s marriage statute and its
“proffered goal” of protecting the “optimal setting for child rearing.” 208
Instead, the State’s marriage statute actually had the counterproductive
effect of depriving the children of same-sex couples of the optimal setting
for child-rearing. 209 And the plurality could not comprehend how it could be
considered rational “to penalize children by depriving them of State benefits
because the State disapproves of their parents’ sexual orientation.” 210
The third of the justifications was “preserving scarce State and private

199.

Id. at 961.

200.

Id.

201.

Id. at 962.

202.

Id.

203.

Id. at 961.

204.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962.

205.

Id.
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Id. at 962–63.

207.

Id. at 963.
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Id. at 961, 963.
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Id. at 963–64.

210.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964.

The Synergistic Evolution of Liberty and Equality

299

financial resources.” 211 Because the plurality was applying low-level
scrutiny, it could not reject this asserted legitimate objective outright.
Instead, it had to ask whether the means bore a reasonable relation to the
end. The plurality noted that the State assumed that same-sex couples are
more financially independent than opposite-sex couples, and therefore they
are less in need of public marital benefits (such as tax advantages) or private
marital benefits (such as employer-financed health insurance). 212 But the
plurality found that the State’s assumption was flawed because “many samesex couples, such as many of the plaintiffs in this case, have children and
other dependents (here, aged parents) in their care.”213 Furthermore, the
plurality observed that the State does not require opposite-sex couples to
demonstrate their financial dependence in order to receive either public or
private marital benefits. 214 Rather, the State makes those benefits available
to opposite-sex married couples “regardless of whether they mingle their
finances or actually depend on each other for support.” 215
After rejecting all three of the State’s justifications for the opposite-sex
marriage statute, the court turned its attention to a final rationale that had
been developed by several amici. They had asserted that “broadening civil
marriage to include same-sex couples will trivialize or destroy the institution
of marriage as it has historically been fashioned.” 216 The plurality
acknowledged that its decision did significantly change the traditional
definition of marriage, but it insisted that its decision would “not disturb the
fundamental value of marriage in our society.” 217 After all, “the plaintiffs
[sought] only to be married, not to undermine the institution of civil
marriage.” 218 The plurality emphasized this point by drawing the following
analogy:
Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of the
same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex
marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to
marry a person of a different race devalues the marriage of a
person who marries someone of her own race. 219
If anything, the plurality observed, “extending civil marriage to same-sex
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Id. at 964.
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couples reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals and
communities” because the fact that same-sex couples are “willing to
embrace marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage
in our laws and in the human spirit.” 220
The plurality’s discussion of the State’s justifications for the sexual
orientation-based classification in the marriage statute in Goodridge was so
extensive because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined
the justifications stereoscopically through the lenses of both liberty and
equality. By contrast, in Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court
examined the State’s justifications solely through the lens of the common
benefits clause. 221 As a result, the Vermont Supreme Court focused almost
exclusively on the question of whether the statutory classification was either
under-inclusive or over-inclusive. 222 The plurality opinion in Goodridge
paid attention to that issue, but it went beyond a consideration of that
question as well.
For example, the courts in both Baker v. State and Goodridge
recognized that, if the state asserts that the justifications for an opposite-sex
marriage statute are promoting procreation and protecting the welfare of
children, then the legislative classification at issue is both under-inclusive
and over-inclusive because it does not exclude opposite-sex couples who are
unable to procreate naturally or who want to marry for reasons unrelated to
procreation, and it does not include same-sex couples with children. But the
plurality in Goodridge went beyond that line of analysis and focused on
reframing the definition of civil marriage as well. It took the position that it
is the “exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one
another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil
marriage.” 223 It then explained that, when the State defines and justifies
marriage by reference to procreation, it is stigmatizing same-sex
relationships by suggesting that they are inherently unstable. Thus, by
looking at marriage through the lenses of both liberty and equality
simultaneously, the plurality was able to reframe the definition of marriage
so as to broaden the institution of civil marriage without destroying it.
Having found that the State’s marriage statute failed to survive nondeferential, low-level scrutiny, the plurality opinion in Goodridge
considered the appropriate form of relief. It noted that, when a plaintiff
makes an equal protection challenge, a court has two options: 1) strike the
statute down; or 2) extend it to the plaintiffs. 224 A majority of the court in

220.

Id.
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Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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See supra notes 125–37 and accompanying text.
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Goodridge opted to extend the marriage statute to the plaintiffs. 225
The plurality announced that it would construe civil marriage to mean
“the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all
others.” 226 It reasoned that reformulating the definition of marriage
redressed the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury while advancing the State’s
legitimate interests. 227 The plurality noted that the plaintiffs had asked for a
declaratory judgment that the State’s marriage license statute violated
Massachusetts law, but they had not asked for an injunction ordering the
State to issue marriage licenses to the plaintiffs. 228 Therefore, it declared that
“barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex
violates the Massachusetts Constitution.” 229 A majority of the court vacated
the summary judgment for the defendant and remanded the case to the trial
court for entry of judgment consistent with the plurality’s opinion. 230 The
court stayed the entry of judgment for “180 days to permit the Legislature to
take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion.” 231
When the legislature later requested an advisory opinion from the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as to whether the court would
permit the legislature to create civil unions for same-sex couples, the answer
was an emphatic “no.” 232 A majority of the court took the position that the
proposed legislation violated both the due process clause and the equal
protection clause of the state constitution. 233 The two dissenting judges, who
would have permitted civil unions, characterized the dispute before the court
as a mere “squabble over the name to be used.” 234 But the majority of the
court characterized the proposed law as one that segregated same-sex unions
from opposite-sex unions, and it adamantly asserted that “separate is seldom,

225. Id. The concurring judge agreed with the remedy ordered by the plurality. Id. at 970
(Greaney, J., concurring).
226.

Id. at 969 (plurality opinion).

227.

Id.
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Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.

229.

Id.

230.

Id. at 969–70.
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Id. at 970.

232. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). More
specifically, the majority said: “[W]e answer that this proposed legislation fails to provide a rational
basis for the different nomenclature.” Id. at 569 n.3.
233. Id. at 572. The legislature apparently had construed the court’s stay as a signal that it could
create civil unions for same-sex couples, but the court explained that “[t]he [sole] purpose of the stay
was to afford the legislature an opportunity to conform the existing statutes to the provisions of the
Goodridge decision.” Id. at 568.
234. Id. at 572 (Sosman, J., dissenting). A third judge wrote a “separate opinion” in which he
declined to consider the question posed by the legislature until after the legislature had completed its
deliberative process. Id. at 580–81 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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if ever, equal.” 235 The majority of the court then explained why the proposed
legislation violated both the principles of liberty and equality under the state
constitution:
We recognize that the pending bill palliates some of the
financial and other concrete manifestations of the discrimination at
issue in Goodridge. But the question the court considered in
Goodridge was not only whether it was proper to withhold tangible
benefits from same-sex couples, but also whether it was
constitutional to create a separate class of citizens by status
discrimination, and withhold from that class the right to participate
in the institution of civil marriage along with its concomitant
tangible and intangible protections, benefits, rights, and
responsibilities. Maintaining a second-class citizen status for samesex couples by excluding them from the institution of civil
marriage is the constitutional infirmity at issue. 236
Thus, the court’s advisory opinion, like its original opinion in Goodridge,
illustrates the synergistic power of joining claims for liberty with claims for
equality in marriage cases brought by same-sex couples.
VI. HERNANDEZ V. ROBLES: AFTER TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK
Post-Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 237 plaintiffs in state
court marriage equality cases suffered a string of losses. 238 If Goodridge
took two steps forward for marriage equality, then these cases took one step
back. This Section will feature just one of the cases, Hernandez v. Robles, 239
on the theory that it is an excellent illustration of both the types of arguments
that parties advanced and the types of opinions that courts handed down
throughout this entire line of cases.
The plaintiffs in Hernandez were forty-four same-sex couples who
hoped to persuade the New York Court of Appeals 240 to follow in the
footsteps of Goodridge. Therefore, they challenged New York’s oppositesex marriage statute on the grounds that it denied them both liberty and
equality under the state constitution. 241 The court observed that it had the
235.

Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 569 (majority opinion).

236.

Id. at 571.

237.

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

238. In the order in which they were decided, the state high court cases in this string of losses
were: Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963
(Wash. 2006); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); and Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571
(Md. 2007).
239.

Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1.

240.
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241.
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power to construe the state constitution independently of the Federal
Constitution, yet it also recognized that it usually looked first to the Federal
Constitution for guidance. 242 The court then noted that, in this case, it would
not consider itself bound 243 by the Supreme Court’s ruling without an
opinion in Baker v. Nelson. 244
With regard to due process, the plaintiffs claimed that each one of them
had a fundamental right “to select and marry the person of his or her
choice.” 245 The three-judge plurality acknowledged that “the right to marry
is unquestionably a fundamental right,” but it immediately reformulated the
issue, stating that the plaintiffs actually were claiming “[t]he right to marry
someone of the same sex.” 246 Not surprisingly, given its narrow definition of
the right at issue, the plurality then found (in accord with Baehr v. Lewin 247)
that the right to same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right because it is
not deeply rooted in tradition. 248
Judge Graffeo, who wrote the concurring opinion, defined the term
“marriage” in its traditional sense as a union of one woman and one man. 249
She thereby linked marriage to procreation (in accord with Baehr). The
plaintiffs suggested that the link between procreation and marriage had
become “anachronistic because of scientific advances in assisted
reproduction technology.” 250 Judge Graffeo was not persuaded, saying that
“the fact remains that the vast majority of children are conceived
naturally.” 251 Consequently, she found that the plaintiffs had no fundamental
right to marry due to their inability to procreate. 252
A majority of the Hernandez court thus completely rejected the
Goodridge court’s reasoning that the right to marry is the civil right to marry
a person of one’s choice. Instead, the court adopted the traditional definition
of marriage (linking it to procreation) and indicated that it would apply very
deferential low-level scrutiny to the opposite-sex marriage statute under the
State’s due process clause. 253 Ironically, although the court did not consider
242.

Id. at 9.

243.

Id.

244.

Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.

245.

Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 14 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
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Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9–10.
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Id. at 14 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
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253. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9–10 (plurality opinion), 14–18 (Graffeo, J., concurring). The
New York Court of Appeals was divided by a vote of four to two in Hernandez because Judge
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itself bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker v. Nelson,
nonetheless its opinion replicated the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in that early marriage equality case. 254
The two dissenting judges, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Kaye,
agreed with the plaintiffs that the right to due process of law includes the
fundamental right to marry, and that central to the fundamental right to
marry is “the right to marry the person of one’s choice.” 255 The dissent
sharply criticized the plurality for recasting the plaintiffs’ claim as one for a
“new” right to same-sex marriage because it demonstrated that the plurality
did not understand that the plaintiffs sought access to the historicallyrecognized institution of marriage, rather than access to a new institution. 256
The dissenting judges also criticized the concurring judge for defining
marriage by reference to tradition and procreation, saying that “‘an argument
that marriage is heterosexual because it “just is” amounts to circular
reasoning.’” 257
Finally, the dissenters took the position that “fundamental rights, once
recognized, cannot be denied to particular groups on the ground that these
groups have historically been denied those rights.” 258 Put another way,
fundamental rights are not defined in terms of “who” is entitled to exercise
them. 259 Once a liberty interest has been identified as fundamental, it “must
be afforded to all.” 260 This is the first moment when the dissenting judges in
Hernandez recognized the synergy between liberty and equality.
Consequently, they took the position that the marriage statute ought to be
subjected to strict scrutiny because it impinged on a fundamental liberty
interest. 261
With regard to equality, the plaintiffs claimed that the opposite-sex
marriage statute should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because it
contained either a sex-based classification or a sexual orientation-based
classification. 262 Both the three-judge plurality and the concurring judge
took the position that the statute did not contain a sex-based classification on
Rosenblatt took no part in the case. Id. at 34.
254. See generally Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
255.

Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 22–23 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).

256.

Id. at 23.

257.

Id. at 26 (quoting Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 172 (Can.)).

258.

Id. at 23.

259.

Id. at 24.

260.

Id. at 24 n.1.

261. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 23. Later in the dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Kaye explained
that it would not be necessary to apply strict scrutiny because the state’s marriage statute could not
survive even rational basis review. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
262.
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the theory that the statute was subject to the equal application defense. 263
They parted company, however, on the question of whether the statute
contained a sexual orientation-based classification. They agreed that the
statute did not “facially” prohibit either heterosexuals or homosexuals from
marrying, 264 but they disagreed as to whether the statute in effect
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.
The plurality found that the plaintiffs had put in sufficient
circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation: “Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex
and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not
treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and
benefits associated with marriage.” 265 The concurring judge (who concurred
in the result only) took the position that, at best, the statute had only a
disparate impact on gays and lesbians because those homosexuals who
wanted to enter into an opposite-sex marriage were not barred from
obtaining marriage licenses. 266 She then emphasized the fact that the
plaintiffs had failed to submit any evidence of what she perceived to be the
requisite proof that the legislature had crafted the marriage statute “for the
purpose of disadvantaging gays and lesbians.” 267
Despite the disagreement between the plurality and the concurring
judge regarding the nature of the classification, they actually were in total
agreement regarding the applicable level of scrutiny. The plurality took the
position that, generally speaking, no more than deferential rational basis
scrutiny is appropriate under the equal protection clause when plaintiffs have
“‘distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the
authority to implement.’” 268 In this case, the plurality found that the
plaintiffs’ “preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the
birth of children is relevant to the State’s interest in fostering relationships
that will serve children best.” 269 In other words, the plaintiffs as same-sex
couples were not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples. And the
concurring judge was of the opinion that the plaintiffs deserved no more
than deferential low-level scrutiny because they had failed to prove that the
legislature passed the opposite-sex marriage statute for the purpose of
disadvantaging gays and lesbians. 270
263.

Id. at 10–11 (plurality opinion), 19–20 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
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Id. at 20 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
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The dissenting judges found both a sex-based classification and a sexual
orientation-based classification. First, they said that the statute contained a
facial, sex-based classification. They refused to recognize the equal
application defense because they took the position that Loving v. Virginia 271
“expressly rejected” that defense. 272
The dissenting judges also observed that the statute, in effect, imposed
different treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. From their perspective,
the statute excluded gay and lesbian couples from the institution of marriage
“[s]olely because of their sexual orientation . . . —that is, because of who
they love.” 273 The dissenters rejected the concurring judge’s theory that the
statute had only a “disparate impact” on gays and lesbians. In the words of
Chief Judge Kaye: “The purported ‘right’ of gays and lesbians to enter into
marriages with different-sex partners to whom they have no innate attraction
cannot possibly cure the constitutional violation actually at issue here.” 274
This is the second moment when the dissenters in Hernandez
recognized the synergy between liberty and equality. Citing to Perez v.
Sharp, 275 they took the position that the right to marry is “‘the right of
individuals, not of groups.’” 276 Consequently, they concluded: “Limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples undeniably restricts gays and lesbians from
marrying their chosen same-sex partners whom ‘to [them] may be
irreplaceable’—and thus constitutes discrimination based on sexual
orientation.” 277 Because the dissenters had defined the right to marry as “the
right to marry the person of one’s choice,” they understood that the
classification at issue in effect imposed disparate treatment on the basis of
sexual orientation.
With regard to the applicable level of scrutiny, the dissenters found that
the sex-based classification was a quasi-suspect classification that ordinarily
would be subject to intermediate-level scrutiny. 278 They then made the pathbreaking finding that the sexual orientation-based classification was a
suspect classification that ordinarily would be subject to strict scrutiny
(based on the history of discrimination against gays and lesbians, the ability
of gays and lesbians to perform and participate in society, and their political
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powerlessness). 279 Yet, despite these findings, the dissenters said: “Although
the classification challenged here should be analyzed using heightened
scrutiny, it does not satisfy even rational-basis review, which requires that
the classification ‘rationally further a legitimate state interest.’” 280 Like the
plurality in Goodridge, then, the dissenters opted to apply a form of lowlevel scrutiny that was not toothless. 281
Because the judges in Hernandez were applying two different forms of
low-level scrutiny, they disagreed about how to state the issue in the case. In
framing the issue under deferential low-level scrutiny, the concurring judge
said: “[T]hese cases turn on whether the Legislature’s decision to confine the
institution of marriage to couples composed of one woman and one man is
rationally related to any legitimate state interest.” 282 By contrast, in framing
the issue under non-deferential, low-level scrutiny, the dissenters said:
“Correctly framed, the question before us is not whether the marriage
statutes properly benefit those they are intended to benefit—any
discriminatory classification does that—but whether there exists any
legitimate basis for excluding those who are not covered by the law.” 283
Even more precisely, the dissenters said: “The relevant question here is . . .
whether the State’s interests in recognizing or supporting opposite-sex
marriages are rationally furthered by the exclusion.” 284
The question of how to frame the issue under low-level scrutiny was so
important in Hernandez because the defendant had articulated a justification
for the State’s marriage statute that was designed to counteract the
Goodridge court’s concern that the state’s justifications for opposite-sex
marriage (e.g., providing a favorable setting for procreation) actually served
to stigmatize same-sex couples and their children. 285 The defendant in
Hernandez contended, and the plurality found, that the purpose of marriage
is to promote responsible procreation. 286 In other words, the plurality found
that “the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of children,
it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in
opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships.” 287 The plurality based its
reasoning on the fact that, in the case of same-sex couples, parenthood is
necessarily intended, while in the case of opposite-sex couples, parenthood
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may be the result of “accident or impulse.” 288 Consequently, as the plurality
opinion concluded: “The Legislature could find that unstable relationships
between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children
will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with samesex couples, and thus that promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships
will help children more.” 289
If the promotion of stability in opposite-sex relationships is a legitimate
state objective, then (in the language of the concurring judge) it “is not
irrational for the Legislature to provide an incentive for opposite-sex
couples—for whom children may be conceived from casual, even
momentary intimate relationships—to marry, create a family environment,
and support their children.” 290 Judge Graffeo recognized that “many samesex couples share these family objectives and are competently raising
children in a stable environment.” 291 But she found that, because most samesex couples rely on assisted reproduction and adoption processes to have
children, they simply are “not similarly situated” to opposite-sex couples
with regard to the primary purpose of marriage, which is the promotion of
responsible procreation. 292
The dissenting judges acknowledged that the State has a legitimate
interest in encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry before they have
children. 293 But, given the way in which the dissenters had framed the issue,
they found that “the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from marriage in no
way furthers this interest.” 294 As Chief Judge Kaye pithily observed: “There
are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.” 295
In addition to considering the newly-minted argument that marriage
promotes responsible procreation, the majority of the court and the
dissenters in Hernandez all considered the long-standing argument that the
definition of marriage is linked to procreation and the rearing of children.
And they all recognized that the opposite-sex marriage classification is both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive 296 for the reasons first articulated by the
court in Baker v. State. 297 However, the majority of the court (in the
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language of the concurring opinion) pointed out that “under rational basis
review, the classification need not be perfectly precise or narrowly
tailored.” 298 Rather, “all that is required is a reasonable connection between
the classification and the interest at issue.” 299 A majority of the court held
that the marriage statute met that test. 300
The dissenters, by contrast, found that “no one rationally decides to
have children because gays and lesbians are excluded from marriage.” 301
They suggested alternative means to the end of promoting procreation, such
as tax breaks to couples with children, subsidizing child care for those
couples, and mandating generous family leave for parents. 302 The dissenters
also found that tradition could not in itself be a rational basis for the
challenged exclusion because “the justification of ‘tradition’ does not
explain the classification; it merely repeats it.” 303
Hernandez is one of several state high court cases that explicitly
rejected the court’s reasoning in Goodridge. 304 The New York Court of
Appeals, like all of the other courts in this line of cases, took one huge step
back. It refused to recognize any synergy whatsoever between liberty and
equality, thereby replicating the reasoning of such state cases as Baker v.
Nelson 305 (even though it did not consider itself bound by the Supreme
Court decision in Baker v. Nelson 306). In applying very deferential low-level
scrutiny and upholding the marriage statute, the court recognized not only
the State’s long-standing “marriage as procreation” argument, but also its
newly-minted “responsible procreation” argument. Chief Judge Kaye,
writing for the dissenters, closed her opinion with the following words: “I
am confident that future generations will look back on today’s decision as an
unfortunate misstep.” 307
VII. IN RE MARRIAGE CASES: FULL RECOGNITION OF THE SYNERGY
BETWEEN LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
The same-sex couples who filed consolidated complaints challenging
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the State’s opposite-sex marriage statutes in In re Marriage Cases 308 (the
California Marriage Cases) asserted both a liberty claim and an equality
claim under the state constitution, 309 hoping that the California Supreme
Court would recognize the potential synergy between the two claims. The
text of the state constitution provides: “A person may not be deprived of . . .
liberty . . . without due process of law or denied equal protection of the
laws.” 310 The state constitution also explicitly provides that the rights
guaranteed by the state constitution “are not dependent on those guaranteed
by the United States Constitution.” 311
California already had enacted comprehensive domestic partnership
legislation, extending to same-sex couples virtually all of the benefits and
imposing on them virtually all of the legal obligations that California law
afforded to and imposed on married couples. 312 The question, therefore, was
“whether, under these circumstances, the failure to designate the official
relationship of same-sex couples as marriage violates the California
Constitution.” 313 The plaintiffs were asking the court to extend the
designation (or name) of marriage to same-sex couples. 314
Chief Justice George wrote the majority opinion, and he turned first to
the due process issue to determine whether the plaintiffs could successfully
claim a fundamental liberty interest in the right to marry. All of the parties
agreed that the right to marry constitutes a fundamental right under the state
constitution. 315 They disagreed, however, as to the nature of the right that the
plaintiffs were claiming.
The defendants took the position that the plaintiffs were invoking a
right to same-sex marriage. 316 The plaintiffs responded that they were
invoking the civil right “‘to join in marriage with the person of one’s
choice.’” 317 That was the due process right which was first recognized in
Perez v. Sharp, 318 the 1948 California Supreme Court decision striking
308.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).

309. Id. at 403 (describing the same-sex couples who were among the several parties to the
consolidated cases).
310.

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.

311.

Id. § 24.

312. The domestic partnership legislation is described by the court. In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d at 397–98.
313.

Id. at 398.

314.

Id. at 452–53.

315. Id. at 419 (noting that past California cases establish “beyond question” that the right to
marry is a “fundamental right”).
316.

Id. at 420.

317. Id. (quoting Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948)) (emphasis added in In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384).
318.

Perez, 198 P.2d 17.
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down the State’s anti-miscegenation statute. The plaintiffs noted that the
court in Perez did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge on the
ground that there was no due process right to interracial marriage. 319 Instead,
Perez extended the fundamental right to marry to interracial couples. 320
The majority of the court agreed that the plaintiffs were not seeking to
create a “new” constitutional right. Nor were they trying to “change” the
existing institution of marriage. 321 Rather, they were contending that,
“properly interpreted, the state constitutional right to marry affords same-sex
couples the same rights and benefits—accompanied by the same mutual
responsibilities and obligations—as this constitutional right affords to
opposite-sex couples.” 322
Two of the dissenting judges took the position that the plaintiffs were
indeed claiming “a new right to same-sex marriage.” 323 Not surprisingly,
they found that there is no deeply rooted tradition of same-sex marriage. 324
The third dissenting judge said: “What is unique about this case is that
plaintiffs seek both to join the institution of marriage and at the same time to
alter its definition.” 325 She opined that the people are entitled to preserve the
traditional name of marriage for opposite-sex couples. 326
Because the majority of the court found that the plaintiffs were claiming
a state constitutional right to marry the person of one’s choice, the majority
proceeded to examine the substantive content of the right. In an
unprecedented opinion, the court held that the right was not merely a
“negative” right, insulating a couple from interference by the State, but also
a “‘positive’ right to have the state take . . . affirmative action to
acknowledge and support the family unit.” 327 More specifically, the court
said that the “positive” right to marry obligates the State “to take affirmative
action to grant official, public recognition to the couple’s relationship as a
family.” 328 The court then concluded:
In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights
embodied in the right to marry—and their central importance to an

319.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 420.

320.

Id.

321.

Id. at 421.

322.

Id.

323.

Id. at 462 (Baxter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).

324.

Id.

325.
part).
326.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 469 (Corrigan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
Id.

327. Id. at 426. The court could cite only to law review articles in support of its unprecedented
view that the constitutional right to marry encompasses a “positive” right. Id. at 427 n.43.
328.

Id. at 427.
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individual’s opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying
life as a full member of society—the California Constitution
properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all
individuals and couples, without regard to their sexual
orientation. 329
This is the first moment of the full recognition of the synergy between
liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. Because the court was
looking at the right to marry through the lenses of both liberty and equality,
just as the court had done in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 330 it
characterized the state constitutional right to marry as a “civil right” to
marry the person of one’s choice. 331 It emphasized that the right to marry “is
often of crucial significance to the individual’s happiness and wellbeing.” 332 And then it extended the right to marry to all, regardless of sexual
orientation. 333 The court refused to let history and tradition define
marriage. 334 It also refused to link marriage to either procreation 335 or
responsible procreation, 336 thereby adopting the reasoning of Chief Judge
Kaye’s dissenting opinion in Hernandez v. Robles. 337
Chief Justice George then moved to the central question in the case:
whether the failure to designate the official relationship of same-sex couples
as “marriage” violated the state constitution’s due process clause. The
Attorney General asserted that no one has a constitutional right to the name
of marriage, and that the State could assign a name other than marriage
(such as registered domestic partnership or civil union) to all couples. 338 The
majority responded by saying:

329.

Id.

330.

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

331.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 427.

332.

Id. at 424.

333.

Id. at 429, 432.

334.

Id. at 430.

335. Id. at 430–32. More specifically, the court said: “The personal enrichment afforded by the
right to marry may be obtained by a couple whether or not they choose to have children, and the
right to marry never has been limited to those who plan or desire to have children.” Id. at 432.
336.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 431–33. More specifically, the court said:
None of the past cases discussing the right to marry . . . contains any suggestion that
the constitutional right to marry is possessed only by individuals who are at risk of
producing children accidentally, or implies that this constitutional right is not equally
important for and guaranteed to responsible individuals who can be counted on to take
appropriate precautions in planning for parenthood.

Id. at 432.
337. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); see supra notes 293–95, 301–03 and
accompanying text.
338.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 434.
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Whether or not the name “marriage,” in the abstract, is
considered a core element of the state constitutional right to marry,
one of the core elements of this fundamental right is the right of
same-sex couples to have their official family relationship
accorded the same dignity, respect, and stature as that accorded to
all other officially recognized family relationships. 339
The court then held that, because the state was denying the name “marriage”
to same-sex couples while granting that “historic and highly respected”
name to opposite-sex couples, the state was “potentially impinging upon the
state constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry,” thereby triggering
strict scrutiny. 340
This is the second moment of the full recognition of the synergy
between liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. The court was
faced with the question of whether the name “marriage” is part of the
constitutional right to marry under the due process clause. It answered the
question by reference to principles of equality. It found that one of the core
elements of the constitutional right to marry is the right to have one’s official
family relationship accorded equal dignity and respect.
With regard to the equal protection clause, the plaintiffs claimed that
the opposite-sex marriage statutes should be subjected to strict scrutiny
because they contained either a sex-based classification or a sexual
orientation-based classification. 341 The dissenting judges would have held
that it was unnecessary to consider how to characterize the classification at
issue because same-sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex
couples for purposes of marriage. 342 The court disagreed, finding that samesex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples because “[b]oth
groups at issue consist of pairs of individuals who wish to enter into a
formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term family
relationship.” 343
This is the third moment of the full recognition of the synergy between
liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. The court had
characterized the constitutional right to marry as the right to marry the
person of one’s choice. It had refused to link marriage to either procreation
or responsible procreation. Instead, it had linked marriage to happiness.
Moreover, the court had defined the constitutional right to marry as the right
to have one’s official family relationship accorded equal dignity and respect.
Therefore, the court was in a position to rule that same-sex couples are

339.

Id.

340.

Id. at 434–35.

341.

Id. at 436.

342. Id. at 464 (Baxter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), 470 (Corrigan, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
343.

Id. at 435 n.54.
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similarly situated to opposite-sex couples for purposes of marriage.
The majority held that the opposite-sex marriage statutes contained a
facial sex-based classification, but that the classification was subject to the
equal application defense. 344 It distinguished Perez and Loving v. Virginia 345
on the ground that both cases involved facial racial classifications where
there was evidence of a legislative purpose to maintain white supremacy. 346
It also observed that most of the prior state court marriage equality cases had
come to the same conclusion. 347
The majority next considered whether the opposite-sex marriage
statutes contained a sexual orientation-based classification. The court
acknowledged that there was no facial sexual orientation-based
classification. 348 Then it said: “In our view, the statutory provisions
restricting marriage to a man and a woman cannot be understood as having
merely a disparate impact on gay persons, but instead properly must be
viewed as directly classifying and prescribing distinct treatment on the basis
of sexual orientation.” 349
This is the fourth moment of the full recognition of the synergy between
liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. Because the court had
defined marriage as the civil right to marry the person of one’s choice, it
understood that gays and lesbians would want to marry someone of the same
sex. A statute restricting marriage to persons of opposite sexes would place
marriage “outside the reach of couples of the same sex,” thereby
unquestionably treating them differently from opposite-sex couples on the
basis of sexual orientation. 350
The court then turned to the question of the applicable level of scrutiny
for sexual orientation-based classifications. The issue was whether to apply
low-level scrutiny or strict scrutiny. The court came to the unprecedented
conclusion that sexual orientation is a suspect classification subject to strict
scrutiny (based on proof of the history of discrimination, the ability of gays
and lesbians to perform or contribute to society, and their historical political
powerlessness). 351
The final issue under the equal protection clause was whether the
marriage statutes impinged upon a “fundamental, constitutionally protected

344.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 436.

345.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

346.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437.

347.

Id. at 438 n.57.

348.

Id. at 440.

349.

Id. at 441.

350.

Id.

351. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441–44. The court did not consider whether sexual
orientation is a quasi-suspect classification because the California courts recognize only two tiers of
scrutiny under the state’s equal protection clause. Id. at 435–36.
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privacy interest.” 352 The court found that, by restricting same-sex couples to
the separate institution of domestic partnerships, and by denying them access
to marriage, the legislature had impinged upon the right of same-sex couples
to have their family relationships accorded equal respect and dignity. 353 The
distinction in nomenclature was a “mark of second-class citizenship.” 354 For
this additional reason, the court held that the marriage statutes ought to be
subject to strict scrutiny under the fundamental interest strand of the equal
protection clause. This is the fifth moment of the full recognition of the
synergy between liberty and equality in the California Marriage Cases. The
court’s opinion demonstrates that the fundamental interest strand of equal
protection analysis is a particularly effective theory for examining an issue
stereoscopically.
When the court applied strict scrutiny to the opposite-sex marriage
statutes, it held that they violated the state constitution. 355 The Attorney
General chose to focus his attention exclusively on the justification of
tradition, stating that “marriage continues to apply only to a relationship
between opposite-sex couples in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
in the United States and around the world.” 356 The court agreed with Chief
Judge Kaye that this limitation on marriage was not necessary to preserve
the rights and benefits of marriage traditionally enjoyed by opposite-sex
couples: “There are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.” 357
Moreover, the court found that excluding same-sex couples from marriage
inflicts a “real and appreciable harm upon same-sex couples and their
children.” 358 Consequently, when the court turned to a consideration of what
would be an appropriate remedy, the court chose to extend the designation of
marriage to same-sex couples. 359

352.

Id. at 444–45.

353.

Id. at 445.

354.

Id.

355.

Id. at 452.

356.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 450–51.

357. Id. at 451 (quoting Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting)).
358.

Id. at 452.

359. Id. at 452–53. In another case holding that a legislative designation of an alternative status
for same-sex couples (civil unions) was unconstitutional, the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed
with the California Supreme Court regarding the appropriate remedy. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 480 (Conn. 2008) (“[T]he traditional definition of marriage . . . must be
expanded to include [same-sex] couples.”). In November of 2008, the people of California passed
Proposition 8, which added the following language to the California Constitution: “Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008).
The California Supreme Court upheld the validity of Proposition 8 on the theory that it was “a
permissible constitutional amendment (rather than an impermissible constitutional revision).”
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009). On the other hand, the court ruled that Proposition 8
would not apply retroactively to void any of the marriages validly entered into before the passage of
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The California Supreme Court was the first state high court to hold that
the right to marry is a fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny not only
under the due process clause, but also under the fundamental interest strand
of the equal protection clause. Additionally, it was the first state high court
to hold that a sexual orientation-based classification is a suspect
classification that must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. The court was able to formulate these unprecedented
holdings because it fully recognized the synergy between liberty and
equality.
VIII. VARNUM V. BRIEN: BUILDING ON THE FULL RECOGNITION OF THE
SYNERGY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
The six same-sex couples who filed a complaint in Varnum v. Brien 360
challenged Iowa’s opposite-sex marriage statute after the Polk County
recorder (Timothy Brien) refused to issue marriage licenses to them. 361 They
asserted both due process and equal protection claims under the state
constitution. 362 The Iowa Supreme Court observed that generally it views
“the federal and state equal protection clauses as identical in scope, import,
and purpose.” 363 At the same time, the court noted that “we have jealously
guarded our right to ‘employ a different analytical framework’ under the
state equal protection clause as well as to independently apply the federally
formulated principles.” 364 By way of example, the court cited to a long line
of Iowa Supreme Court cases going back to 1839 in which the court had
recognized the constitutional rights of slaves, racial minorities, and women
years before the United States Supreme Court had recognized comparable
rights under the Federal Constitution. 365
In Varnum, the Iowa Supreme Court issued the first unanimous opinion
in a marriage equality case, with Justice Cady writing for the court. It is an
elegant opinion which builds upon the California Supreme Court’s full
recognition of the synergy between liberty and equality. Justice Cady opened
his opinion with a quotation from the state motto: “Our liberties we prize
and our rights we will maintain.” 366 He observed that the “primary

Proposition 8. Id. Propostion 8 is now being challenged in federal court under the Federal
Constitution. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV09-2292 (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 2009),
available at http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/legal-filings/plaintiffs-filed-complaint/.
360.

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).

361.

Id. at 872.

362.

Id. at 873.

363.

Id. at 878 n.6.

364.

Id.

365.

Id. at 877.

366.

Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872 n.1.
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constitutional principle at the heart of this case is the doctrine of equal
protection,” 367 and he found it unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs’ other
claims. 368 Nevertheless, his discussion of equal protection is infused with
references to the fundamental right to marry, as defined by the California
Supreme Court. 369 Therefore, although his opinion initially appears to be
based exclusively on the state constitution’s equal protection clause,
nevertheless, it is an exquisite example of an opinion that fully recognizes
the synergy between liberty and equality.
Justice Cady opened his discussion of the equal protection issue by
stating: “This issue comes to us with the same importance as our landmark
cases of the past.” 370 Next, he observed that the same-sex marriage debate
before the court was “part of a strong national dialogue centered on a
fundamental, deep-seated, traditional institution that has excluded, by state
action, a particular class of Iowans.” 371 Finally, he set forth the specific
equal protection issue in the case: “How can a state premised on the
constitutional principle of equal protection justify exclusion of a class of
Iowans from civil marriage?” 372
The court first considered the threshold issue under the State’s equal
protection clause—whether the plaintiffs were similarly situated to oppositesex couples. The defendant sought to undermine the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim by asserting that the plaintiffs “are not similarly situated to
opposite-sex couples . . . because the plaintiffs cannot ‘procreate
naturally.’” 373 Put another way, the defendant argued that the statute treated
dissimilar persons differently. In response, the court explained that, when
analyzing the similarly situated issue, it would not “simply look at the trait
used by the legislature to define a classification under a statute and conclude
that a person without that trait is not similarly situated to persons with the
trait.” 374 Since all members of any class are similarly situated in this respect,
the court observed that “‘any classification whatsoever would be reasonable
by this test.’” 375 Instead, the court held that “the equal protection guarantee
requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated with respect to

367.

Id. at 876.

368.

Id. at 906 n.32.

369.

Id. at 878, 882–84.
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Id. at 878.
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Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 878.

373.

Id. at 882.

374.

Id.

375. Id. (quoting Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 345 (1949)).
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the purposes of the law alike.” 376
The court then explained that the plaintiffs were in “committed and
loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual couples,”
thereby emphasizing the fact that one of the reasons for marriage is to
promote “comfort and happiness.” 377 Moreover, the court found that
officially recognizing their status would provide “an institutional basis for
defining their fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it
does for heterosexual couples.” 378 In short, the court concluded that, for
purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, “which are designed to bring a sense of
order to the legal relationships of committed couples and their families in
myriad ways,” the plaintiffs were “similarly situated in every important
respect, but for their sexual orientation.” 379 Therefore, the court refused to
recognize the defendant’s threshold challenge to the application of the equal
protection clause.
This is the first moment when the court recognized the synergy between
liberty and equality in Varnum. It found that procreation is not the sine qua
non of marriage. Instead, it found that marriage is intended to promote the
comfort and happiness of committed couples and to bring order and stability
to their relational rights and responsibilities as well as to their families.
Consequently, the court concluded that same-sex couples are similarly
situated to opposite-sex couples with respect to the purposes of marriage.
The next issue before the Iowa Supreme Court was the nature of the
classification. The court below had held that the opposite-sex marriage
statute classified on the basis of sex, but Justice Cady took the position that
the statute actually classified on the basis of sexual orientation. 380 He
recognized that the statute did not contain a facial sexual orientation-based
classification. 381 Nevertheless, he rejected the defendant’s argument that the
statute had only a disparate impact upon gay and lesbian people. 382 Instead,
he characterized the statute as containing an implicit sexual orientationbased classification that resulted in disparate treatment. 383
Justice Cady explained his position by describing the plaintiffs as
individuals who are “sexually and romantically attracted to members of their
own sex.” 384 He then observed that, when “[v]iewed in the complete context
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379.

Id. at 883–84.

380.

Id. at 884.

381.

Id. at 885.

382.

Id.

383.

Id.

384.

Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872.
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of marriage, including intimacy, civil marriage with a person of the opposite
sex is as unappealing to a gay or lesbian person as civil marriage with a
person of the same sex is to a heterosexual.” 385 Thus, he concluded, “the
right of a gay or lesbian person under the marriage statute to enter into a
civil marriage only with a person of the opposite sex is no right at all.” 386
Instead, a gay or lesbian person can only gain the same rights under the
statute as a heterosexual “by negating the very trait that defines gay and
lesbian people as a class—their sexual orientation,” meaning that the statute
“differentiates implicitly” on the basis of sexual orientation. 387
This is the second moment when the Iowa Supreme Court recognized
the synergy between liberty and equality in Varnum. Because the court had
found that marriage is intended to promote the comfort and happiness of
committed couples, and because it understood that gay and lesbian persons
are sexually and romantically attracted to members of their own sex, the
court realized that a gay or lesbian person would not want to marry a person
of the opposite sex. Therefore, it ruled that the classification at issue was in
effect a sexual orientation-based classification.
The court then turned to the question of the applicable level of scrutiny
for sexual orientation-based classifications. It took the position that such
classifications are quasi-suspect classifications subject to intermediate
scrutiny (based on the history of discrimination, the ability of gays and
lesbians to contribute to society, the immutability of sexual orientation, and
the historical political powerlessness of gay and lesbian people). 388 When
the court applied heightened scrutiny, it found that the statute violated the
equal protection clause because it was both over-inclusive and underinclusive for all of the reasons first set forth by the court in Baker v. State. 389
Finally, Justice Cady considered the appropriate remedy, noting that
courts in other jurisdictions either had allowed the state legislature to create
an alternative status for same-sex couples or had extended marriage to
them. 390 The court refused to authorize the Iowa legislature to create an
alternative status (such as civil unions), stating: “This record, our own
independent research, and the appropriate equal protection analysis do not
suggest the existence of a justification for such a legislative classification
that substantially furthers any governmental objective.” 391 Consequently, the
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388. Id. at 886–87, 897. The Iowa Supreme Court utilizes “the traditional” three-tiered analysis
under the state constitution’s equal protection clause. Id. at 896 n.23.
389. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 900–02; see also supra
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court held that “the language in [the Iowa marriage statute] limiting civil
marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken from the statute, and the
remaining statutory language must be interpreted and applied in a manner
allowing gay and lesbian people full access to the institution of civil
marriage.” 392
Because the court throughout its opinion had examined the equal
protection challenge stereoscopically through the lenses of liberty and
equality, it understood when it came to the remedial phase of the case that
the plaintiffs were entitled to both the status of marriage and the statutory
benefits of marriage. The plaintiffs could not be treated as second-class
citizens by confining them to an alternative status, such as civil unions.
Instead, they were entitled to an inclusive remedy that would afford them
full access to the institution of civil marriage.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined selected marriage cases brought by same-sex
couples in state courts under state constitutions in order to understand the
role played by liberty and equality in this one segment of gay rights
litigation. It is the thesis of this Article that, when gay rights litigators and
state courts have considered the two constitutional claims independently of
each other, neither claim standing alone has been strong enough to provide a
basis for extending the institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples. But,
when gay rights litigators and state courts have focused on both claims
simultaneously, looking at the institution of marriage stereoscopically, the
synergistic effect of the interplay between the two claims gradually has
enabled the courts to rethink the fundamental question of whether marriage
is an exclusive institution for opposite-sex couples only. In some of the cases
under review, after the courts have looked at the institution of marriage
through the lenses of liberty and equality simultaneously, they have come to
the twin conclusions that the state’s opposite-sex marriage statute is
unconstitutional and that same-sex couples must have full access to the
institution of civil marriage. These are the decisions that represent the
culmination of the synergistic evolution of liberty and equality in the state
court marriage cases to date. They are also the decisions that may provide a
model for state and federal court marriage litigation in the future.
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